U.S. and Saudi Arabia Sign Nuclear Agreement

The new U.S.–Saudi nuclear deal quietly trades away some of the toughest global safeguards while opening a path for uranium enrichment on Saudi soil.

Story Snapshot

The U.S. approved a 30-year civilian nuclear agreement that lets Saudi Arabia enrich uranium using American technology.
The deal skips the strongest United Nations inspection rules, relying instead on a custom system run mainly by Washington and Riyadh.
Supporters say U.S. control and new safeguards keep the program peaceful and create American jobs.
Critics warn the weaker guardrails could arm a future nuclear race in a region already on edge.

What Washington Just Agreed To With Saudi Arabia

The United States Energy Department says Washington and Riyadh have reached a civil nuclear power agreement that lets Saudi Arabia build reactors with American technology and enrich uranium for fuel. The pact, often called a “123 Agreement,” is set to last about 30 years and is expected to involve U.S. companies across Saudi Arabia’s nuclear supply chain. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the deal and a related safeguards agreement in Washington. Officials say the accord aims to boost U.S. exports, create American jobs, and deepen strategic ties with a key oil producer.

The agreement gives Saudi Arabia a pathway to enrich nuclear fuel inside its borders, with any future enrichment done in facilities run by U.S. firms using technology that is not shared with the kingdom. Under the deal, the two countries will first carry out a two-year study to decide if enrichment in Saudi Arabia is needed and commercially sensible. If Washington objects after that review, one reported version says Saudi Arabia would be barred for a decade from turning to other foreign partners for enrichment. For now, the kingdom commits to rely on U.S. companies as its nuclear partners of choice for large new power plants.

Safeguards, Oversight, and What Was Left Out

Trump administration officials insist the agreement follows the nonproliferation rules in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which they call among the world’s strongest. Civil nuclear cooperation deals under Section 123 of that law normally require strict conditions: partners must keep material under safeguards “in perpetuity,” accept full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight, and gain U.S. consent before any enrichment or reprocessing. In this case, the administration submitted a waiver report to Congress saying the bilateral safeguards use “additional safeguards and verification measures” focused on the most sensitive steps, like enrichment, fuel fabrication, conversion, and reprocessing.

At the same time, the new U.S.–Saudi accord does not include the IAEA’s “Additional Protocol,” which allows surprise inspections at undeclared locations and deeper access to nuclear sites. Earlier administrations pushed that protocol as a key tool to catch cheating. The United Arab Emirates agreed to this stricter package and also signed away any right to enrichment or reprocessing, earning the nickname “gold standard” deal. The Saudi agreement drops both that no-enrichment pledge and the Additional Protocol, replacing them with customized safeguards run mainly through U.S. and Saudi channels.

Why This Alarms Nonproliferation Experts

Experts who study nuclear spread say the core risk is “latent” weapons capacity. A country that can enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel can, if it chooses later, shift that know-how toward bomb material. Heritage Foundation, Arms Control Association, and others note that Section 123 rules were strengthened after past problems to prevent exactly that outcome. They worry that allowing enrichment without the strongest international inspections makes it easier for Saudi Arabia, or a future leader, to edge closer to weapons without clear warning to the world.

Critics point to leaked documents and media reports saying the Trump administration “lifted restrictions on uranium enrichment and rapid U.N. inspections” in order to close the deal. A Government Accountability Office review earlier in the process found that talks over nonproliferation terms with Saudi Arabia had stalled, and that the U.S. government’s management of the negotiations was unclear. Arms control advocates argue that Washington had a chance to press for a higher bar, given Saudi Arabia’s lack of any urgent commercial need for its own enrichment plant, and chose instead to relax standards to win the business.

How This Fits a Bigger Pattern of Frustration With Washington

For many Americans on both the right and the left, this deal hits familiar nerves. Conservatives who oppose globalist deals see Washington helping a foreign monarchy gain nuclear capabilities while everyday problems at home, from border security to energy prices, still feel ignored. Liberals who worry about war and inequality see another elite bargain, shaped by corporate and geopolitical interests, that could make the Middle East even more dangerous. Both sides question whether this truly serves the average American family.

Supporters reply that if Saudi Arabia is going to build nuclear plants, it is better for the United States to be deeply involved than to leave the field to Russia or China. They argue U.S. firms and regulators can keep the technology safer, tie Riyadh into American standards, and retain leverage through fuel supply and technical control. Yet the fact remains that key parts of the agreement are still secret or described only in broad language. That opacity, combined with weaker inspections and a clear path to enrichment, feeds a growing sense that major decisions about war, peace, and nuclear risk are being made far from public view.